In many social and economic networks, agents' outcomes depend substantially on the centrality of their network position. Our current understanding of network centrality is largely restricted to deterministic settings, but in many applications data limitations or theoretical concerns lead practitioners to use random network models. We provide a foundation for understanding how central agents in random networks are likely to be. Our main theorems show that on large random networks, centrality measures are close to their expected values with high probability. By applying these theorems to stochastic block models, we study how segregated networks contribute to inequality. When networks are segregated, benefits from peer effects tend to accrue unevenly to the advantage of more central individuals and groups.
tic problems. The proofs of these theorems rely on random graph theory, and in particular utilize a recent result by Chung and Radcliffe (2011) .
Our main application of these theorems is to the connection between homophily (the tendency for links to form within groups more than between groups) and inequality of outcomes. To isolate the role of networks in distributions of outcomes, we look at distributions of centralities of agents and consider how unequal these distributions are. Returning to the example of education, within-school homophily is an important factor in understanding how social interactions matter for educational outcomes (Echenique, Fryer, and Kaufman (2006) ). Most student populations at schools in the United States include groups of students of multiple races, and social connections tend to be denser within these groups than between groups. We examine the consequences of this segregation for particular groups as well as for overall distributions of performance.
We ask how distributions of centrality change as we vary link probabilities to increase or decrease homophily. To do so we consider stochastic block models of network formation: agents are divided into several groups and the probability two agents are connected depends on their groups. Our first results are in a simple model with two groups and two distinct link probabilities for connections between and across groups. We compare distributions using a strong notion of relative inequality of outcomes, Lorenz dominance. By this measure, more segregated networks are indeed more unequal. This dynamic tends to persist with more than two groups, but more subtleties appear.
We also discuss how our theorems could be applied to more general network formation models. An alternative to group structure is geography, with agents situated in a continuous space and geographically closer agents connecting with higher probabilities. We give a numerical example where centralities vary non-monotonically in a parameter determining how much connections are concentrated locally. We also give a formula for centralities in a network depending on several independent characteristics, such as homophily and geography.
In addition to centralities, modifications of our theorems apply to a number of other economically relevant quantities related to eigenvectors or powers of a network's adjacency matrix. One example is influence in the DeGroot learning model, which is the first eigenvector of a stochastic matrix derived from the adjacency matrix (Golub and Jackson (2010)).
Another example is the social segregation index of Echenique and Fryer (2007) , so our methods also describe how segregated individuals and groups will be in random networks.
The structure of the paper is as follows: the remainder of this section discusses related literature. In Section 2, we introduce notation and describe our family of network formation models. Section 3 defines and discusses eigenvector centrality and Katz-Bonacich centrality.
The two main theorems about centrality measures are given in Section 4. Section 5 examines the impact of homophily on inequality in networks using stochastic block models. Other network formation models are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes, and proofs and further extensions appear in the Appendix.
Related Literature
This paper contributes to several areas of active research in network economics: literatures on centrality measures, inequality in networks and homophily.
There are long literatures in sociology and more recently economics aiming to quantify how central individuals are in a network (e.g. Katz (1953) and Bonacich (1987) ). By exploring the mean field theory and comparative statics of eigenvector and Katz-Bonacich centrality, we add to a theoretical literature on centrality measures. One existing approach is to understand centrality measures in terms of their formal properties. Dequiedt and Zenou (2017) and Bloch, Jackson, and Tebaldi (2017) provide axiomatic characterizations of several centrality measures, including degree and Katz-Bonacich.
Another approach connects centrality measures to games on networks. As observed by Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) as well as many subsequent papers, Katz-Bonacich centralities are equal to Nash equilibrium strategies in games with appropriate quadratic utility functions. So when agents are choosing a level of effort in the presence of peer effects, Katz-Bonacich centrality approximates their choice well. These claims are motivated by a number of empirical papers identifying agent decisions and/or outcomes in settings with peer effects with Katz-Bonacich centrality. In education, Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou (2009) show the Katz-Bonacich centralities of students in friendship networks substantially predict academic performance. In the context of networks of R&D alliances, König, Liu, and Zenou (2014) associate quantities closely related to Katz-Bonacich centrality with firm performance and then carry out welfare calculations. These analyses and many others use network games with quadratic utility as a microfoundation.
The applications in Section 5 connect to network economics literatures on inequality and homophily. There has been growing interest in how network structure affects inequality, though this research is disperse in topics and models. Kets, Iyengar, Sethi, and Bowles (2011) consider allocations which are stable with respect to deviations by highly connected subgroups, and show that denser networks lead to more equitable distributions. Kets, Iyengar, Sethi, and Bowles (2011) use the Lorenz dominance relation to compare distributions, and we use the same relation in Section 5.1. Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) (2008)). We contribute to this varied literature by looking at a setting where network structure influences outcomes because of peer effects and by examining how homophily matters for inequality.
Like centrality, homophily in networks has been an active research area in sociology, economics and computer science for decades (see McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001) for a survey). The methods in the current work are closest to those in Golub and Jackson (2012)'s work on homophily and the speed of learning. Like Golub and Jackson we consider stochastic block models, and we also use techniques from random matrix theory to reduce questions about the spectra of random networks to questions about a fixed deterministic network. The relevant spectral quantity is the second eigenvalue in their work and the first eigenvector here. Stochastic block models are also used in much of the community detection literature, which studies algorithms for finding subgroups in homophilous networks (e.g. Karrer and Newman (2011) ).
In this section, we specify notation for networks and define a stochastic model of network formation. Because the amount of homophily in the network depends on parameters determining the sizes of groups and probabilities of links between groups, we can vary homophily in different ways by changing these parameters.
Notation
A network is a set of nodes N = {1, ..., n} and a set of edges contained in N ×N . All networks will be undirected, so that (i, j) is an edge whenever (j, i) is an edge. The neighbors N i of node i are the set of nodes connected to node i by an edge.
A network is determined by its adjacency matrix A, which is defined by A ij = 1 if there is an edge between agents i and j and A ij = 0 otherwise.
A walk on a network is a finite sequence of vertices such that each pair of consecutive vertices in the sequence are connected by an edge. A walk containing k + 1 vertices has length k.
Given a vector v ∈ R n , the Euclidean norm is denoted by v 2 . Given an n × n matrix A, the matrix 2-norm A 2 is defined by sup v 2 =1 Av 2 . When A is a symmetric matrix, A 2 is equal to the maximum absolute value of an eigenvalue of A.
Random Networks
We define random networks by generating links independently with link probabilities specified by a matrixĀ. Each edge between agents i and j is formed with probabilityĀ ij . These links are generated independently, so that the entries of the adjacency matrix of the network are independent random variables.
Given an n × n matrix of link probabilitiesĀ, we generate one instance of a network with n agents and let A be the adjacency matrix of this network.
Stochastic block models are our leading example. Consider a set of n nodes divided into m groups. In a stochastic block model, the probability of an edge between two agents depends only on their groups, so thatĀ kl = p ij whenever agent k is in group i and agent l is in group j.
Note that bothĀ and A are symmetric matrices. As a consequence, both matrices have n eigenvalues, and these eigenvalues are real. Let λ 1 , λ 2 , ..., λ n be the eigenvalues ofĀ, ordered so that
Similarly, let λ 1 , λ 2 , ..., λ n be the eigenvalues of A, ordered so that
We assume that all link formation probabilities are positive, so thatĀ is a positive matrix and satisfies the conclusions of the Perron-Frobenius theorem. In particular this matrix has a unique eigenvector with largest eigenvalue, λ 1 , and this eigenvector has non-negative real entries.
Finally, we consider sequences of random networks indexed by the population size n.
Definition 1. A sequence of random networks is, for each n in a sequence of positive integers converging to infinity, an n×n matrix of probabilitiesĀ(n) and an adjacency matrix A(n) of a network generated with these probabilities.
Centrality Measures
We consider two common measures of centrality, which we refer to as Katz-Bonacich centrality and eigenvector centrality. These notions of centralities are defined by linear equations, and therefore interact well with stochastic block models. In subsequent sections, we discuss how the distributions of centralities of agents in stochastic networks depend on parameters in the network formation model.
Katz-Bonacich Centrality
We first discuss the Katz-Bonacich centralities of agents in a network. This measure can be interpreted in terms of both linear algebra and graph theory.
Fix a constant 0 < φ < A −1 2 . Then Katz-Bonacich centrality is defined by:
Definition 2. The Katz-Bonacich centrality of agent i with respect to the constant φ is
where 1 the vector with all entries 1.
This equation is solved by
Because (A k ) ij is the number of walks from agent i to agent j, this series has a combinatorial interpretation. The Katz-Bonacich centrality of agent i is the number of walks beginning (or ending) at agent i, with each discounted according to its length with discount factor φ. So larger values of φ correspond to counting shorter connections more heavily,
while smaller values of φ correspond to counting longer walks more.
A growing literature relates Katz-Bonacich centrality to strategies and outcomes in games on networks. Suppose that agents choose a level of effort which determines outcomes, and that the utility of the agent when effort levels are e is
This functional form implies that utility is quadratic in effort levels and that there are complementarities between an agent's effort and their neighbors' effort. Then at a Nash equilibrium the strategies e * satisfy e * = φAe * + 1.
So the equilibrium strategies are given by Katz-Bonacich centralities:
Therefore, in these games, effort is equal to Katz-Bonacich centrality and utility is a simple function of Katz-Bonacich centrality. If we assume that effort determines outcomes and that peer effects manifest through the costs to effort, then an agent's outcome is just their Katz-Bonacich centrality.
Eigenvector Centrality
Eigenvector centrality is a closely related notion. The eigenvector centrality of agent i is the i th coordinate of the eigenvector of the adjacency matrix with eigenvalue of largest absolute value. More formally: which maximizes |λ| and satisfies v 2 = 1.
Remark 1. If the first eigenvalue has multiplicity greater than one, the eigenvector centrality may not be uniquely defined. Our results will not depend on the choice of convention in these cases.
Remark 2. Because we must choose a normalization, the ratios between the eigenvector centralities of different agents are more meaningful than the levels of each agent's centrality.
An agent's eigenvector centrality is proportional to the sum of their neighbors' eigenvector centralities:
In other words, eigenvector centrality is a measure of how many neighbors an agent has, with more central neighbors counting more.
The definitions of Katz-Bonacich centrality and eigenvector differ only by the term 1.
Moreover, eigenvector centrality can be thought of as a limit of Katz-Bonacich centralities.
More precisely, the Katz-Bonacich centrality c(A, φ) approaches the line spanned by the eigenvector centrality v(A) in the limit as φ approaches A −1 2 from below. To clarify the dynamics behind results in later sections, we describe a stylized model relating eigenvector centrality to peer effects. Suppose that each individual begins with an endowment w i (0) in period 0. In each period t + 1, each individual's endowment changes to cw i (t) + j∈N i w i (t). This says that an agent's resources are a linear combination of their resources from the previous period and the sum of their neighbors' resources from the previous period. In matrix notation,
Then as t → ∞, the endowments w(t) become proportional to v. The limit as endowments are repeatedly updated is the eigenvector centrality. This model closely resembles the mechanical process in Section V.A of Echenique and Fryer (2007) .
Centrality on Random Networks
This section characterizes the centralities of agents in networks generated using stochastic block models. With high probability, the vector of centralities will be close to a deterministic vector depending on the link probabilities. In Sections 5.1 and 5.2, these results will aid in understanding the impact of link probabilities, and thus the amount of homophily, on the distributions of centralities of agents.
Before stating these theorems, we will state and discuss two technical conditions. Definition 4. We say that a sequence of random networks has non-vanishing spectral gap if there exists δ > 0 such that
This says that the ratio between the second eigenvalue and the first is bounded away from one. This ratio measures the amount of homophily in the network, so the spectral gap is non-vanishing when there is not extreme homophily (see Golub and Jackson (2012)).
Intuitively, the condition says the network cannot be split into two subgroups which are nearly disconnected.
A non-vanishing spectral gap ensures that the eigenvector centrality ofĀ is uniquely defined. In cases of extreme homophily, there can be multiple eigenvectors with the largest eigenvalue corresponding to different disconnected groups or collections of groups. With non-vanishing spectral gap, we avoid this situation with high probability.
Definition 5. We say that a sequence of random networks has large enough eigenvalues
The intuitive content of this technical condition is that (1) the degrees of agents grow sufficiently faster than log n, and (2) there is no group which has a fraction of members vanishing quickly and a non-vanishing fraction of links as n grows large. To better understand this intuition, we use the following fact (Lev (2014)):
When the right-hand side grows faster than ∆ log n asymptotically, the sequence has large enough eigenvalues.
In Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we study sequences of stochastic block networks for which each group's fraction of the total population remains fixed as n grows, and all link probabilities p ij also remain fixed. It is easy to see these sequences have large enough eigenvalues.
Theorem 1. Suppose A(n) is a sequence of random networks that has non-vanishing spectral gap and has large enough eigenvalues. Let > 0. For n sufficiently large, with probability at least 1 − the matrix A(n) has a unique largest eigenvalue λ 1 (n) and the eigenvector
where · 2 is the Euclidean norm.
The theorem says that in large networks, the eigenvector centralities of all agents approach their expected values, and these expected values can be computed from the probabilities of links. Notably, the eigenvector centralities of all agents are bounded uniformly.
The result has the flavor of the law of large numbers, and that theorem gives some intuition for why the bounds hold. By the law of large numbers, for n big enough most agents have approximately the expected number of links to each other group. This suggests their eigenvector centralities will also be close to their expected values, though an actual proof requires more substantive random graph theory.
The key tool is a result from Chung and Radcliffe (2011) which bounds the norm of the matrix A(n) −Ā(n) and the difference between the eigenvalues of A(n) andĀ(n). We show that with large enough eigenvalues, their result implies that for n large, the matrix norm A(n) −Ā(n) 2 is small and the difference λ 1 (n) − λ 1 (n) is small compared to λ 1 (n).
Given these bounds, we can show thatĀ(n) and A(n) map the eigenvector centrality v(A(n)) to nearby vectors. In particular, the image of v(A(n)) underĀ(n) has norm close to λ 1 (n). Because we bound the spectral gap ofĀ below, the image of a unit vector underĀ(n)
only has norm close to the first eigenvalue when that vector is close to the first eigenvector v(Ā(n)).
We next state the analogous result for Katz-Bonacich centrality.
Theorem 2. Suppose A(n) is a sequence of random networks that has large enough eigen-
Then the vectors of Katz-Bonacich centralities satisfy
The statement is essentially the same as Theorem 1, with eigenvector centrality now replaced by Katz-Bonacich centrality. So this result says that the Katz-Bonacich centralities of all in large networks are close to their expected values, and these expected values also depend only onĀ.
The proof uses the same bounds on the matrix norm A(n) −Ā(n) 2 . The idea is then to express the relevant Katz-Bonacich centralities as a sum of matrix powers, and to bound the differences between these matrix powers with the bounds on A(n) −Ā(n) 2 .
In Appendix B, we provide several extensions of Theorems 1 and 2. Subsection B.1 allows non-integer edge weights by replacing the Bernoulli random variables A ij with uniform random variables. Subsection B.2 allows clustering by giving versions of the theorems for networks placing additional weight on triangles along with dyads.
Now that we understand how to compute the centrality of agents on large stochastic block networks, we can study the relationship between the parameters governing link formation and distributions of centrality. This in turn elucidates connections between homophily in network formation and inequality of outcomes. These connections are strongest and most evident in networks with just two groups, so we begin with this case.
Inequality with Two Groups
Suppose that there are two groups in our network. For simplicity, we assume there are just two probabilities of link formation: p s = p 11 = p 22 for links within the same group and p d = p 12 for link between different groups. Let s denote the share of the population in the majority group, so that the group sizes are sn and (1−s)n. 1 Then we can establish a number of dominance results using the following criterion.
In words, distribution x Lorenz dominates distribution y if for each k, the share of total resources held by the poorest k individuals in distribution x is at least the share earned by the poorest k individuals in distribution y. Geometrically, the definition says that the Lorenz curve of distribution x (which plots the share of resources held by the poorest k individuals) lies above the Lorenz curve of distribution y.
Lorenz domination gives a partial order on distributions which nests a wide family of measures of inequality. Most notably, if distribution x Lorenz dominates distribution y then
x also has a smaller Gini coefficient than y.
Proposition 1. With probability approaching 1 as n → ∞: Increasing p s and decreasing p d both correspond to increasing homophily. So part (i) says that more segregated networks lead to more unequal outcomes. Special cases include fixing one of the parameters p s and p d , as well as varying the two parameters so that the total number of links stays fixed while the fraction of links within groups increases.
For more intuition for these results, recall that for any non-zero w(0), A t w(0) is approximately proportional to v(A) for t large. So we can consider repeatedly updating individuals'
With more links within groups, resources flow to larger groups. With more links between groups, the flows of resources are more equal.
Part (ii) says that when neither group is too large, a bigger majority group means more inequality. There are two effects here. The first is that as the minority group becomes smaller, its members do worse. But the second effect is that as the minority group grows smaller, there are more individuals in the better off group. When group sizes are in the range ( 1 2 , s), the first effect is more important. When a majority groups is much larger than the corresponding minority group, though, we can obtain two distributions that cannot be compared using Lorenz dominance. The smaller minority group does worse, but is also smaller, so we cannot determine which distribution is more unequal (without specifying a more restrictive measure of inequality). Using Theorem 1, the proof is reduced to computing the eigenvector centrality ofĀ.
With two groups, this only requires computing the first eigenvector of a 2 × 2 matrix.
Finally, part (i) of the result applies with eigenvector centrality replaced by Katz-Bonacich centrality. The proof and intuition are similar to Proposition 1. We can invert a 2 × 2 matrix or use formulas for inverses of block matrices. The basic intuition about group sizes is also similar, but there are not clean results because the analog of s depends on n.
Comparative Statics with More Groups
In more general settings, changes in link parameters can have more unpredictable effects.
We focus on comparative statics of Katz-Bonacich centrality and ask which groups benefit more from changes in link parameters. In a setting which maintains some of the restrictions from the previous section, we characterize the effects of various changes. We then give an example showing that without these restrictions, extra links between group 1 and group 2 can benefit other well-connected groups more than group 1.
With two groups, we were able to show that increased homophily led to more inequality, measured by a strong notion of dominance. This is too much to hope for with more than two groups, so we instead ask which agents benefit most from new links. In particular, we now consider changes in centrality in absolute terms, while Section 5.1 evaluated changes in relative terms.
In Appendix C, we provide two formulas for the comparative statics of Katz-Bonacich centrality as some link probability p ij changes. The first expresses the derivative of c i (A, φ) as a suitably weighted count of the number of walks beginning at agent i. The second is a more explicit expression depending on the link probabilities p ij , and is easy to compute in examples. These formulas are used to prove the propositions in this section, and may also be useful tools in other settings.
Return to the general setting with m groups of arbitrary sizes. We maintain the assumption that there are two link probabilities, depending on whether the relevant nodes are in the same group or different groups. So the probabilities of link formation are p s = p ii for all i and p d = p ij for all i = j.
To facilitate simple statements of results, all comparative statics are first given for deterministic networksĀ with non-integral weights. The corresponding results for sequences of random networks follow as corollaries.
Let ∂ ∂ps c(Ā, φ) denote the derivative of Katz-Bonacich centrality as the entries ofĀ corresponding to within-group links vary.
whenever i's group is larger than j's group.
When more links are added within groups, agents in larger groups benefit more than agents in smaller groups. Because c i (Ā, φ) is increasing in i's group size in this setting, this means that adding connections within groups increases inequality (in absolute terms).
There are two effects contributing to this result. First, increasing p s increases the degree of agents in larger groups more than the degree of agents in smaller groups. Second, because agents in larger groups are more central already, these agents are better positioned to benefit from extra links in other areas of the network. By contrast, when p d changes we will see these two effects work in opposite directions.
We next consider a sequence of random networks and fix all relative group sizes, so that each group i has size s i n for some rational constants s i summing to one and independent of n. LetĀ(n) be the matrix of link probabilities arising from these group sizes, withingroup link probability p s and between-group link probability p d . DefineĀ (n) similarly, with probabilities p s and p d .
Corollary 1. Suppose that p s > p s and p d = p d . Fix a sequence of φ(n) bounded away from λ 1 (n) and λ 1 (n). Then with probability approaching 1 as n → ∞,
Using Theorem 2, we can reduce from random networks to deterministic weighted networks. Then the result is a simple application of Proposition 3.
When we vary the probability p d of links between groups, results are more ambiguous. Let Proposition 4. There exist constants 0 < φ < φ < λ −1 such that:
whenever i's group is smaller than j's group.
There are now two opposing effects, so extra links between groups can help smaller groups more or larger groups more. First, increasing p d now increases the degree of those in smaller groups more than the degree of those in larger groups. But second, agents in larger groups are still better positioned to take advantage of extra links at a distance.
When φ is small, Katz-Bonacich centrality primarily counts shorter walks. So the first effect wins out, and smaller effects benefit more. When φ is close enough to λ −1 1 , Katz-Bonacich centrality is dominated by walks of very long length. Then the first effect is tiny while the second effect is large.
The first result is a straightforward consequence of the relationship between degree centrality and Katz-Bonacich centrality with φ small. For the second result, we want to compare suitably weighted counts of the number of walks beginning in each group. When φ is large, these counts are dominated by very long walks, and for very long walks the starting group has little effect.
For the following Corollary, we defineĀ(n) andĀ (n) as in Corollary 1.
Corollary 2. Suppose that p s = p s and p d > p d . Fix a sequence of φ(n) bounded away from λ 1 (n) and λ 1 (n). Then there exist constants C, C ∈ (0, 1) such that with probability approaching 1 as n → ∞, (i) if φ(n) < Cλ −1 1 (n) for all n, then c i (A (n), φ(n)) − c i (A(n), φ(n)) > c j (A (n), φ(n)) − c j (A(n), φ(n)) whenever i's group is smaller than j's group.
(ii) if φ(n) > Cλ −1 1 (n) for all n,
The proceeding results relied on the assumption that there are only two link probabilities p s and p d , depending on whether a pair of agents are in the same group or in separate groups.
With more link probabilities, a wide range of comparative statics are possible. We now give one interesting example.
Let ∂Ā ∂p ij c(Ā, φ) be the derivative of the Katz-Bonacich centrality as the entries ofĀ corresponding to links between group i and group j vary. Proposition 5. There exist link-formation probabilitiesĀ, groups i, j and k, and a constant
Adding links between groups i and j increases the Katz-Bonacich centrality of agents in group k more than those in group i. This is an indication of the power of central network position: group k is so well connected that its members are better positioned to take advantage of new links than the agents in group i actually forming those links.
To prove the proposition, we give an example with three groups such that connections within group 1 are very dense, connections between groups 1 and 2 are somewhat sparse, and all other connections are very sparse (see Figure 2 ).
Then if extra links are added between groups 2 and 3, group 2 adds more short connections than group 1. But group 1 adds more longer walks. This is because there are many long walks that begin in group 1, remain there for many links, and then finish by crossing to group 2 and then group 3. But most long walks beginning in group 2 and spending most of their time in group 1 must pass between groups 2 and 3 twice, which is less likely. So when φ is large, the Katz-Bonacich centrality of a member of group 1 increases more than the Katz-Bonacich centrality of members of group 2.
The example extends to actual random networks. We again consider m groups with relative group sizes fixed, but now allow the entries p ij ofĀ to be any constant probabilities.
The entries ofĀ are equal to the entries ofĀ, except for a single pair of groups i and j.
Corollary 3. There exists p ij > p ij , a sequence of constants φ(n) bounded away from λ 1 (n) and λ 1 (n) and groups i, j and k such that with probability approaching 1 as n → ∞, c k (A (n), φ(n)) − c k (A(n), φ(n)) > c i (A (n), φ(n)) − c i (A(n), φ(n)).
General Stochastic Networks
In this section, we discuss further applications. The first subsection discusses network formation models based upon geography and gives some numerical examples. The second subsection gives a model of random networks in which link formation probabilities depend on several characteristics. Under independence assumptions, the centralities can be computed characteristic by characteristic.
Geography
A common alternative to network formation models based upon group structure relies instead on geography. Agents are distributed in a continuous space with a distance metric, and closer agents are more likely to be connected. Our tools can help determine how network centralities in these models depend on underlying parameters.
In the latent space model proposed by Hoff et al. (2002) , each link between agent i and agent j forms with probability proportional to exp(β · x i,j + d(i, j)), where x i,j are covariates of the pair, β is a constant vector and d(i, j) is the geographic distance between i and j. When all links form independently, our theorems apply to sequences of such networks.
We give a numerical example in a similar model. Another functional form commonly used in empirical work sets the probability of a link between agents i and j to d(i, j) −ρ . The parameter ρ determines how quickly connections decay at a distance.
Consider agents arranged on an (k + 1) × (k + 1) grid in the plane, so that there is one agent at each point in Each link between distinct (x, y) and (x , y ) has weight d((x, y), (x , y )) −ρ where d is Euclidean distance, and each self-link has weight 1. We consider eigenvector centralities in this network, and Theorem 1 implies centralities on the corresponding random network are very close for k large. Figure 3 illustrates an example with k = 20 and ρ = 1.
As ρ varies, the rankings between eigenvector centralities of various agents vary as well.
For example, with k = 20 and ρ = 1 10 , the agent in position (0, 10) is more central than the agent in position (3, 3). But when ρ = 1, the agent in position (3, 3) is more central than (0, 10). The first agent is on the boundary in one direction, while the second is near the boundary in both directions and further from the central agent at (10, 10). When ρ is large, connections at distance 1 or 2 are most important and (3, 3) has many of these. When ρ grows small, having many connections at intermediate distances becomes more valuable.
Note that in the limit ρ → 0 all agents become equally central, so the difference (or ratio) between the centralities is non-monotonic in ρ.
Multilayer Networks
We can build a larger class of network formation models by combining several characteristics. For example, we could model agents of different races or genders living in different neighborhoods by combining a stochastic block model with a model based upon geography.
When characteristics are independent, centralities depend on the two characteristics in a simple, separable manner.
LetĀ (1) andĀ (2) be two matrices of link probabilities for networks of sizes n 1 and n 2 , respectively. We will let ⊗ denote the Kronecker product. We define multilayer random networks, which combine the two networks by multiplying link probabilities.
Definition 7. The multilayer random networkĀ =Ā (1) ⊗Ā (2) with layersĀ (1) andĀ (2) has n 1 n 2 agents indexed by (i 1 , i 2 ) and link probabilities between (i 1 , i 2 ) and (j 1 , j 2 ) given by the productĀ
(2) i 2 j 2 of the corresponding link probabilities in the two layers.
IfĀ (1) andĀ (2) correspond to two characteristics in the network, thenĀ is the network formed by assuming the two characteristics are independently distributed and links form when they would form in both layers independently. These assumptions are strong, but let us obtain clean expressions for centralities in the multilayer network.
Lemma 1. The eigenvector centrality of agent (i 1 , i 2 ) in the multilayer random networkĀ is given by
The lemma says that eigenvector centrality can be computed characteristic by characteristic and multiplied together. Note that we can rephrase the result as stating that
This standard fact can be used to show that centralities behave similarly on actual random networks.
Proposition 6. SupposeĀ (1) (n 1 ) andĀ (2) (n 2 ) are sequences of random networks which both have non-vanishing spectral gaps and large enough eigenvalues. LetĀ(n 1 n 2 ) be the corresponding sequence of layered random networks. For any > 0, with probability approaching one as n → ∞ v(A(n 1 n 2 )) − v(A (1) (n 1 )) ⊗ v(A (2) (n 2 ) 2 < .
So v (i 1 ,i 2 ) (A) is very likely to be close to v i 1 (A (1) )v i 2 (A (2) ) for each agent (i 1 , i 2 ). When link probabilities are multiplicative, so are centralities. The proof applies Theorem 1 and Lemma 1.
The results extend immediately to networks with more than two layers.
Conclusion
We gave asymptotic characterizations of the eigenvector and Katz-Bonacich centralities of agents in random networks. Theoretically, these results simplify questions about how changing network structure affects who is central. These results also provide justification for considering centrality in applied settings where full network data is unavailable: in large networks we can approximate agents' centralities well using only link formation probabilities for various groups.
As an application, we explored how varying homophily in stochastic block networks changes distributions of centrality. To do so we developed more general techniques for taking comparative statics of Katz-Bonacich centrality. We found that integration decreases inequality in most cases. But when distant connections are valuable, individuals who are already very central can be best positioned to take advantage of additional integration and even new links in other groups.
It also follows from the proof of the theorem cited that
M v is the matrix norm induced by the Euclidean norm.
Because the sequence has large enough eigenvalues, 4∆ log(2n/ ) ≤ f (n)λ 1 for some
On the other hand, we can write v = α 1 v + α 2 w, where w is a unit vector orthogonal to v and α 2 1 + α 2 2 = 1. Because the orthogonal complement to v is the span of the other eigenvectors ofĀ, we have Ā w ≤ λ 2 .
Because the sequence has non-vanishing spectral gap,
Combining the upper and lower bound on Ā v , we conclude that 2f (n) ).
Because f (n) → 0 and α 2 1 + α 2 2 = 1, this implies that α 2 → 0 as n → 0. So taking n sufficiently large, we conclude that v(n) − v(n) < with probability at least 1 − .
Proof of Theorem 2. We have (I − φ(n)Ā(n)) −1 = ∞ k=0 φ(n) kĀ (n) k , and the analogous formula for A(n).
There exists K and N such that
whenever n ≥ N . Increasing N if necessary, we can assume as in the proof of Theorem 1 that φ(n)(Ā(n) − A(n)) < /(K 2 ) and ∞ k=K φ(n) kĀ (n) k < with probability 1 − whenever n ≥ N .
Dropping the arguemnts P and n,
By induction, this is less than /K for k < K.
The first term is less than because each summand is less than /K, and the second term is less than as well. So the difference of Katz-Bonacich centralities is less than 2 .
Proof of Proposition 1. Theorem 1 tells us that for a sequence of random matrices generated as in the proposition statement with population size N i , the first eigenvector of each matrix Group size is a bit more complicated. Let
be the total of the entries of the first eigenvector.
Differentiating this shows that ∂T ∂s is non-negative if and only if
We conclude that the first eigenvector corresponding to (s, p s , p d ) Lorenz dominates the first eigenvector corresponding to (s , p s , p d ) if s ≤ s and
Proof of Proposition 2. We use the equation for the inverse of a block matrix,
With this, we compute
This vector is proportional to
is increasing in p s and decreasing in p d , the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 3. We want to show that
when i is in a larger group than i . By Lemma 2, we have
where the inner sum is over walks of length k beginning at agent i and f (γ k ) is the number of edges of γ k from a group to itself.
We claim that
for each k.
For length 1 walks, note that the number of walks from i to an agent in another group is independent of i's group, and each of these walks has f (γ 1 ) = 0. The number of walks from i to an agent in the same group is increasing in the size of i's group, and each of these walks has f (γ 1 ) = 1. So we can choose an injection φ 1 from the set of length 1 walks beginning at i to the set of length 1 walks beginning at i preserving f (γ 1 ) and sending each walk γ 1 to a walk φ 1 (γ 1 ) such that the group φ 1 (γ 1 ) ends in is at least as large as the group that γ 1 ends in.
Given a map φ k−1 satisfying these properties, we can construct φ k satisfying the same properties. We send γ k to a walk defined by using φ k−1 to determine the first k agents and then defining the last agent as in the previous paragraph. This proves the claim.
Proof of Corollary 1. By Proposition 3,
for all n. We must check that Theorem 2 applies.
The sequence has large enough eigenvalues becauseλ 1 (n) is O(n), as is ∆. The non-zero eigenvalues ofĀ(n) are proportional to the eigenvalues of the matrix
where s 1 , s 2 , ..., s m are the population shares in each group. By the Perron-Frobenius theorem the first and second eigenvalues of this matrix are distinct, so the sequence has non-vanishing spectral gap.
Choose small enough so that c i (Ā (n), φ(n)) − c i (Ā(n), φ(n)) − 2 > c j (Ā (n), φ(n)) − c j (Ā(n), φ(n)) + 2 .
With probability approaching 1 as n → ∞,
and similarly for the other three centrality terms. So the desired inequality holds with probability approaching 1 as n → ∞.
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Let d i (Ā) denote the degree of agent i. As φ → 0, the Katz-Bonacich centrality
is equal to positive affine transformation of the degree centrality of φ, plus terms of order φ 2 . As p s increases, the change in degree ∂ ∂p d d i (Ā) is equal to the total number of agents n minus the size of agent i's group. In particular, this derivative is decreasing in the group size.
(ii) Suppose i's group is larger than j's group.
By Lemma 2, the derivative of the Katz-Bonacich centrality of agent i is
where the sum is over walks γ k of length k starting at agent i, the indices i 0 , i 1 , ..., i k are the groups that the walks pass through, and g(γ k ) is the number of times γ k switches groups.
Consider the Markov chain with states corresponding to the agents in our network and transition probabilities from state l to state l given by p ll / m j=1 p lj . The probability that the Markov chain is in state j at time k given initial state i is equal to the probability that a random walk of length k ends at j, where each walk is chosen with probability proportional to k−1 j=0 p i j i j+1 . The Markov chain converges to a stationary distribution. Therefore as k → ∞, the expected number of times the Markov chain has switched states by time k approaches ck for some constant c independent of the initial state. So as k grows large,
is bounded below by a constant greater than 1.
As φ approachesλ −1 , the right-hand side diverges to ∞. Moreover, the argument above showed that
is bounded below by a constant greater than 1 for k sufficiently large. So
for φ large enough.
Proof of Corollary 2. Fix some n 0 . By Proposition 4, there exists φ such that
whenever 0 < φ < φ and i's group is larger than j's group.
The Katz-Bonacich centralities ofĀ(n 0 ) are a positive affine transformation of the Katz- 
where s i are the population shares of each group. This is because the centralities are proportional except the constant term corresponding to length zero walks. The same statement holds forĀ (n 0 ) with the same rescaling.
The upshot is that the inequality comparing centralities does not depend on the choice of n 0 . So it follows that for any n such that φ(n)/λ 1 (n) < φ/λ 1 (n 0 ), we have c i (A (n), φ(n)) − c i (A(n), φ(n)) > c j (A (n), φ(n)) − c j (A(n), φ(n)).
The remainder of the proof of part (i) proceeds as in the proof of Corollary 1, and the analogous argument shows part (ii).
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose we have three groups of equal size K = n/3 such that p 11 = 1, p 12 = p 21 = , and all other link probabilities are 0. We will show that for φ sufficiently large and sufficiently small,
Note that agent 1 is in group 1 while agent n/3 + 1 is in group 2.
To check this identity, note that
where P is the 3 × 3 matrix with entries P ij = p ij . The entries (I − φA) −1 kl are equal to the entries (I − φP ) −1 ij corresponding to the groups of k and l. Using Lemma 3, we compute
Taking δ → 0 and φ → 1/K (keeping φ feasible), we find the first expression is larger than the second.
Proof of Corollary 3. By Proposition 5, we can chooseĀ andĀ with n 0 agents each such that p ij is larger inĀ thanĀ and other link probabilities agree, groups i, j and k and a constant φ <λ 1 such that
Define sequences of stochastic block networks by letting all relative group sizes and link formation-probabilities be the same as inĀ andĀ , respectively. Let φ(n) = n n 0 φ for each n. Then arguing as in the proof of Corollary 2, we find that
for each n.
The proof concludes with the same arguments as the proof of Corollary 1.
Proof of Lemma 1. See for example Theorem 13.12 of Laub (2005) .
Proof of Proposition 6. By Theorem 1, we have v(A (i) (n i ) − v(Ā (i) (n i ) 2 < /2 for n i sufficiently large and i = 1, 2. By the triangle inequality v(Ā (1) (n 1 )) ⊗ v(Ā (2) (n 2 )) − v(A (1) (n 1 )) ⊗ v(A (2) (n 2 )) 2 is less than or equal to v(Ā (1) (n 1 )) ⊗ v(A (2) (n 2 )) − v(A (1) (n 1 )) ⊗ v(A (2) (n 2 )) 2 + v(Ā (1) (n 1 )) ⊗ v(Ā (2) (n 2 )) − v(Ā (1) (n 1 )) ⊗ v(A (2) (n 2 )) 2 .
Because v is normalized to have Euclidean norm one, each of these two terms is less than /2. Becauseλ 1 , ∆ and log(n) are all multiplicative in the Kronecker product,Ā(n 1 n 2 ) has non-vanishing spectral gap and large enough eigenvalues. So by Theorem 1, vA(n 1 n 2 ) − v(Ā (i) (n i ) 2 < for n 1 n 2 sufficiently large.
So we have v(A(n 1 n 2 )) − v(A (1) (n 1 )) ⊗ v(A (2) (n 2 )) 2 ≤ v(Ā(n 1 n 2 )) − v(Ā (1) (n 1 )) ⊗ v(Ā (2) (n 2 )) 2 + v(Ā (1) (n 1 )) ⊗ v(Ā (2) (n 2 )) − v(A (1) (n 1 )) ⊗ v(A (2) (n 2 )) 2 + v(Ā(n 1 n 2 )) − v(A(n 1 n 2 )) 2 .
The first term is zero by Lemma 1. The second and third term are each at most by the preceding paragraphs.
B Extensions B.1 Weighted Edges
In this subsection, we relax the assumption that A ij ∈ {0, 1} to allow non-integral edge weights A ij ≥ 0. The centrality measures v(A) and c(A) are defined as before.
Suppose that for each pair of groups i and j, the edge weights between agents in group i and group j are independent uniform random variables on some interval [l ij (n), u ij (n)].
Then Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 hold as before withĀ(n) = E[A(n)].
Proof. First note that we can approximate uniform random variables on some non-negative interval [l, u] by linear combinations of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with positive coefficients. We discuss the case l = 0 and u = 1, and the argument extends easily.
Consider the weighted sum with coefficients 2 −k for k = 1, ..., m of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables equal to 1 with probability 1 2 . As m → ∞, this sum converges in probability to the uniform random variable on [0, 1].
In the proof of Theorem 1 of Chung and Radcliffe (2011), the authors express A as a sum of independent random matrices X ij , where X ij is the product of a Bernoulli random variable equal to one with probability p ij and the matrix with entries (i, j) and (j, i) equal to one and all other entries zero. We instead express A as a sum of independent variables X ij,k corresponding to the terms in the sum in the previous paragraph. Because all relevant quantities are continuous and our previous arguments do not depend on the number of random variables, our proof proceeds as before when we take m sufficiently large.
B.2 Clustering
When edges have non-integral weights, it is straightforward to allow clustering in the network.
We present a variation of our model in which weights between i and j are likely to be higher when both agents are connected to some other agent k. This dynamic is produced by allowing triangles to form in addition to pairwise connections.
As before, for each pair of agents k in group i and l in group j we draw either an independent Bernoulli random variable equal to one with probability p ij or a uniform random variable on [l ij (n), u ij (n)]. In addition, for each triplet of agents k, k and k in groups i, i , and i we draw either an independent Bernoulli random variable equal to one with probability p ii i or a uniform random variable on [l ii i (n), u ii i ]. The entry A ij is equal to the sum of these random variables over the pair i, j and all triplets including i and j.
Then Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 still hold withĀ(n) = E[A(n)]. The proof is a straight-For any l and l , (I − φP ) ll is equal to the discounted number of walks which begin at some fixed agent in group l and end at any agent in group l . On the other hand, the entries of ∞ t=0 (φA) t correspond to the discounted numbers of walks which begin at some fixed agent in group l and end at some fixed agent in group l .
The derivative ∂(φA) ∂p ij of A as we vary the link probability between groups i and j has entries equal to φ when one index corresponds to an agent in group i and the other to an agent in group j and all other entries zero. So we compute that the double summation above
as desired. The two terms correspond to walks passing through an edge from group i to group j and walks passing in the opposite direction.
